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Abstract 
This essay revisits the controversy between Louis Althusser’s Marxist 
structuralism and Edward P. Thompson’s Marxist humanism. It draws 
conclusions from this controversy for the foundations of a Marxist theory of 
communication. The controversy’s key disagreements concern the questions 
of how the economic and the non-economic (the base/superstructure 
problem) as well as structures and agency are related. Whereas Althusser 
focuses on articulation and overdetermination, Thompson stresses the role of 
experience in society in general and class societies in particular. This essay 
reflects on how both these approaches relate to the role of communication in 
society and capitalism.  
Communication is a process, in which humans produce and reproduce social 
relations in manners that mediate not just understanding the world and other 
humans, but also the dialectic of structure and agency and the dialectic of 
society’s realms. For a Marxist theory of society, also the forgotten meaning of 
communication as commoning is of crucial importance. 
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<3:> In contemporary society, there is much talk about the role of 
communication in society. One can hear and read a lot about social media, 
the information economy, the creative industry, the cultural industries, the 
digital economy, digital labour, the information society, the information 
economy, information work, etc. A critical theory of communication can guide 
our understanding of how communication shapes and is shaped by 
contemporary society’s power structures. Jürgen Habermas’ theory of 
communication takes a dualist approach that separates communication and 
power (see Fuchs 2016). It is therefore appropriate to explore how an 
alternative critical theory of communication can go beyond Habermas and for 
doing so draw on various traditions of critical thought. This paper makes a 
contribution to <4:> this task by dealing with the question: How can Louis 
Althusser and Edward P. Thompson’s controversy on base/superstructure 
and structure/agency inform a critical theory of communication? 
 
The base/superstructure problem deals with the question of how the 
economic and the non-economic are ontologically related. The 
structure/agency problem is about the relationship of human subjects and 
their practices to society’s structures. To find answers, we need theories of 
society. In one way or another, all social theories have to deal with these two 
problems. But Marxist theories have given particular attention to these 
questions because they are especially concerned with the role of the capitalist 
economy in society, capitalism’s structural contradictions, and class struggles. 
Althusser and Thompson have made two distinct contributions to this debate. 
The world of ideas and the communication of ideas have in Marxist theories 
especially been reflected in the categories of class-consciousness and 
ideology. The base-superstructure problem also poses questions about the 
relationship of the material and the ideational in society. One of its concerns is 
what role ideas have in relation to the economy and society. If we want to 
establish foundations of a critical theory of communication, it is therefore 
worthwhile to revisit discussions about the relationship of the economy and 
culture, the economic and the non-economic, and structure/agency.  
 
Louis Althusser’s works on Marxism are among the 20th century’s most 
influential French contributions to critical theory. His most well-known works 
are For Marx (Althusser 2005 [1965), Reading Capital (Althusser and Balibar 
2009 [1968)), and the essay Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 
(Althusser 1971, 127-186). Althusser’s approach of structuralist Marxism has 
influenced among others Alain Badiou, Antonio Negri, Ernesto Laclau, 
Étienne Balibar, Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Rancière, Manuel 
Castells, Michel Foucault, Nicos Poulantzas, Régis Debray, Stuart Hall, and 
Slavoj Žižek.  
 
Edward P. Thompson is one of Britain’s most well known historians and 
Marxist scholars. Carl Winslow, editor of E. P. Thompson and the Making of 
the New Left, a collection of important essays of Thompson, characterises this 
influential Marxist scholar in the book’s introduction as “one of the great 
figures of the post-Second World War left” (Thompson 2014, 9). His best-
known works are The Making of the English Working Class (Thompson 1963) 
and a biography of William Morris (Thompson 2011 [1955]). Thompson was a 
humanist socialist who questioned structuralism’s theoretical and political 
implications. Given Althusser’s structuralism and Thompson’s humanism, we 
can expect these authors to approach the base/superstructure problem and 
the structure/agency-question in quite different ways. And this difference gave 
rise to a controversy expressed in Thompson’s (1978) book The Poverty of 
Theory. This work became one of the most well known criticisms of Althusser. 
For example it inspired Perry Anderson (1980) to write a 200 page long 
constructive engagement that discusses the commonalities of and differences 
between Thompson and Althusser. 
 
This essay proceeds by introducing the background (section 2), discussing 
Althusser’s conception of base and superstructure (section 3), engaging with 
Thompson’s critique of Althusser (section 4), and an outline of foundations of 
how a critical theory of communication can draw on and go beyond the 
Althusser and Thompson-debate (section 5). 
 
Thompson is not just a historian, but is also considered as a representative of 
cultural studies. There is a close relationship between cultural studies and 
communication studies. We therefore want to briefly discuss aspects of 
communication in cultural studies as background to the engagement with 




Culture is a system of meaning-making, whereas communication is the 
process of (re)producing social relations, sharing and co-constructing 
meanings. Wherever there is culture, there is communication. Whenever we 
communicate, we create culture. Cultural studies and communication studies 
are therefore two closely related fields of study. Stuart Hall (1980) argues 
cultural studies is based on two paradigms: The “culturalism” of Raymond 
Williams, Richard Hoggart and E. P. Thompson on <5:> the one hand; and 
Althusserian structuralism on the other hand. Hall characterises Thompson’s 
work as focusing on “classes as relations, popular struggle, and historical 
forms of consciousness, class cultures in their historical particularity” (Hall 
1980, 61). Hall argues that for both Williams, Hoggart and Thompson culture 
is “interwoven with all social practices” and “sensuous human praxis” through 
which “men and women make history” (Hall 1980, 63). The “creative” and 
“historical agency” constitute “the two key elements in the humanism” (63) of 
what Hall terms culturalism. In contrast, structuralism foregrounds language, 
the whole, the mode of production and ideology as social structures and the 
human being as a bearer of structures. It stresses the “articulation of parts 
within a structure” (65) and “determinate conditions” (67).  
 
Hall (1980, 72) argues that he wants to “think forwards from the best elements 
in the structuralist and culturalist enterprises”. But in fact his own work was 
more influenced by Althusser’s and Laclau’s structuralism than by so-called 
“culturalism”. This becomes evident in one of Hall’s most read and cited 
works, the Encoding/Decoding-essay. In this essay, Hall applies Marx 
dialectic of production, circulation and consumption to the means of 
communication. “Thus – to borrow Marx’s terms – circulation and reception 
are, indeed, ‘moments’ of the production process in television” (Hall 1973, 3). 
Hall’s paper visualises the communication process as a process of encoding 
and decoding that consists of structures of production, technological 
infrastructures, knowledge frameworks, meaning structures, discourses, and 
programmes (Hall 1973, 4). So for Hall, communications are structures for the 
articulation, encoding and decoding of meanings and discourses. The human 
being and its work, creation and social production process are missing in this 
structuralist model.  
 
Raymond Williams (1976) distinguishes between communication and 
communications: Whereas communication for Williams means “the passing of 
ideas, information, and attitudes from person to person” (9), a definition that 
foregrounds human beings and their relations, he sees as institutions, forms 
and systems, i.e. structures of communication. In Williams’ terms, Hall 
focuses more on communications than communication. 
 
Policing the Crisis is the work, where Hall’s Althusserian structural Marxism 
comes to its height. Let us consider two brief, but typical passages: The state 
“organises ideologically, through the cultural sphere and the education system 
–  once again, progressively expanded and complexified as the productive 
needs it serves develop; through the means and media of communication and 
the orchestration of public opinion” (Hall et al. 1978, 205). “Events, as news, 
[…] articulate what the audience is assumed to think and know about the 
society.” (56). Hall argues here that the ideological state apparatuses of the 
education system and the media system organise ideology and that news 
events articulate ideology. The point here is that cultural structures and not 
humans are said to act. Hall (1989, 48) says that in communication, meaning 
and ideology, “discourse is articulated to power” (Hall 1989, 48). Not humans 
are the subjects, but discourse is a subject that acts. Hall (1982) writes that 
humans are positioned and languaged (80), ideological discourses win their 
way (80) and discourse speaks itself through him/her (88). For Hall (1997, 5), 
“representational systems” such as language and music “communicate 
feelings and ideas”. 
 
The problem with all of these formulations is that they neglect the mentioning 
of active human beings who communicate with each other and so produce 
social relations. For Hall and structuralism, it is not humans who communicate 
ideology, ideas, discourse, feelings, etc. through language, music, news 
media and other representational system. He rather assumes structures and 
systems language, speak, communicate, etc. Human communication is 
subsumed under communications, i.e. structures and systems of 
communication. Communication is reduced to the status of a structure. Such 
an approach misses that communication is a social process that connects 
humans and establishes and maintains relations between them. It is the social 
practice, in which humans produce and reproduce sociality and social 
relations by making sense of each other and the world. It is no surprise that 
the term “human” is not mentioned once in Hall’s Encoding/Decoding-paper. 
Hall misses that discourses, communication, and ideology are the processes 
that relate humans and help constituting particular power relations. 
 
<6:> In the 1980s and 1990s, the major theoretical influence on Hall’s 
approach was no longer exerted by Althusser’s structural Marxism, but 
Foucault’s post-structuralism and Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism. Hall’s 
cultural studies thereby undertook a “shift away from its encounter with 
marxism” (Sparks 1996, 95). What remained was the structuralist outlook, 
which becomes for example evident in Hall’s later works, such as the 1997 
book Representation. While Althusser is not mentioned a single time, Hall 
conceives of representation based on Foucault’s concepts of discourse, 
power, and knowledge, as well as Saussure’s and Barthes’ semiotics. Dealing 
with the question of the subject, Hall (1997, 54) argues that Saussure “tended 
to abolish the subject from the question of representation” and that for 
Foucault, it is “discourse, not the subject, which produces knowledge”. Just 
like earlier in the 1970s, Hall also here takes a structuralist position and 
argues that it “is discourse, not the subjects who speak it, which produces 
knowledge”, that the subject is merely “produced within discourse” and 
“subjected to discourse”, and that the subject is “the bearer of the kind of 
knowledge which discourse produces” (Hall 1997, 55). In contrast to Hall, E.P. 
Thompson (2014) takes a socialist humanist position. He explains in his essay 
Socialist Humanism that in this approach “real people” (73) and the “creative 
agency of human labour” (76) form the “centre of […] aspiration” (73) and 
“man is human by virtue of his culture” (59). Whereas for Thompson, the 
human being’s agency is at the core of attention, for Hall it is structures and 
not humans that act as subjects. Thompson’s approach is grounded in Marx’s 
“new humanism” that struggles for a society, in which every individual can 
fully and freely develop (Dunayevskaya 2000, 125) and where the “ultimate 
creation of freedom rests upon the shortening of the working day” 
(Dunayevskaya 2000, 89)  
 
The analysis of structures is not unimportant, but it is insufficient to focus on 
how structures are articulated with each other and condition practices. There 
is a dialectic of structure and agency that any analysis of communication must 
take into account. The approach that I take is much closer to humanism, i.e. 
an approach that according to Marx starts from “the existence of living human 
individuals” (Marx and Engels 1845/46, 31) who produce in common. And to 
produce also means to communicate.  
 
This approach constructs a critical theory of communication through the 
reading of humanist Marxist works from a communication perspective. This 
method also takes into account the dialectic of structure and practices, but 
starts from human beings and their social relations of life and production. The 
approach I use on the one hand focuses on more well known works, such as 
Raymond Williams works on communication, to argue for a communicative 
materialism (Fuchs 2017). On the other hand, it also tries to reconstruct lesser 
known works or elements in works from a communications perspective. E.P. 
Thompson is remembered as one of the primary historians of the English 
working class. He practiced history as history from below, which means that 
he tells the history of the working class through the analysis of workers’ 
everyday culture, customs, practices, experiences and struggles. By doing so, 
the question arises what the role is of communication in these processes. A 
reading of Thompson’s work and its relation to Althusser is one of several 
entries into and starting points for a critical theory of communication. In his 
discussion of Williams’ Long Revolution, Thompson warned of the assumption 
that “the central problem of society today is not one of power but of 
communication”. This means that communication must in a critical analysis 
always be related to issues of power and class.   
 
Whereas Thompson and Williams were life-long Marxists, Hall’s relation to 
Marxian theory was ambivalent, “contingent and transitory” (Sparks 1996, 97). 
Furthermore, Thompson and Williams understood themselves explicitly as 
socialist humanists. These are two reasons why Thompson is one of the 
appropriate starting points for a critical theory that stands in the traditions of 
humanism and Marxism.  
 
Given the outline of some background, we can next engage with the 
Althusser/Thompson-debate. 
 
3. Louis Althusser 
 
Althusser (2005) sees a social formation as consisting of various levels and 
instances (101) that together form an organic totality (102). He distinguishes 
<7:> between the economic mode of production and “the superstructures, 
instances which derive from it, but have their own consistency and effectivity” 
(100). The mode of production consists of the forces and relations of 
production (110) that form contradictions and are the social formation’s 
“conditions of existence” (100, 110). The superstructure includes “the State, 
the dominant ideology, religion, politically organized movements, and so on” 
(106). The superstructure for Althusser consists of a political and an 
ideological level – “the State and all the legal, political and ideological forms” 
(111; see also Althusser 1971, 134). “So in every society we can posit, in 
forms which are sometimes very paradoxical, the existence of an economic 
activity as the base, a political organization and ‘ideological’ forms (religion, 
ethics, philosophy, etc.)” (Althusser 2005, 232). In the essay Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses, Althusser (1971, 135-136) uses the metaphor 
of an edifice with different floors for describing the relationship of base and 
superstructure. It is “the base which in the last instance determines the whole 
edifice” (Althusser 1971, 136) 
 
In Althusser’s theory, we find a “relative autonomy of the superstructures and 
their specific effectivity”, but there is the “determination in the last instance by 
the (economic) mode of production” (Althusser 2005, 111). All levels are 
related and influence each other, but the economy is the overdetermining 
factor. Althusser says there is a “mutual conditioning” of levels and 
contradictions (205). “The superstructure is not the pure phenomenon of the 
structure, it is also its condition of existence” (205). Althusser takes from Mao 
(1937) the idea that there is always one overdetermining, principal, dominant, 
leading contradiction and structure (Althusser 2005, 101, 211). It would not in 
advance and eternally be determined what the “determinant-contradiction-in-
the-last-instance” is, but the economy would in the last instance 
overdetermine other levels in the selection of the structure in dominance 
(213)1. For Althusser, one contradiction dominates other contradictions. One 
level dominates other levels. Althusser speaks of the structure in dominance 
(200). In capitalism, the contradiction between forces and relations of 
economic production is for him the “principal contradiction” (208). 
 
The problem of the Althusserian approach is not just that it makes the 
economic the causally determining factor of society. It simultaneously under- 
and overestimates the role of the economic. The separation of society into 
economic, political and cultural levels underestimates the economy by 
ignoring that it operates in all social systems in the form of human production 
and work. Rules and ideologies do not simply exist. Humans produce and 
reproduce them. The political and the cultural are economic and non-
economic at the same time (Fuchs 2015, chapters 2+3). But not just are 
culture and politics economic, the economic is also cultural and political.  
                                            
1 See also: Althusser and Balibar (2009, 251) 
Althusser underestimates the operation of the non-economic in the economic 
realm. An example is that the ideologies of individual performance, developing 
the self, loving your work, etc. operate at the workplace. The cultural 
industries are a realm of the organisation of the economy, in which news, 
music, films, software, entertainment, art and other forms of knowledge are 
produced. These industries today form a significant part of the capitalist 
economy and are another example of culture operating inside of the economy. 
Althusser’s separation of levels cannot adequately explain the dialectics of the 
economic and the non-economic.  
 
That Althusser is a post-humanist philosopher becomes evident by the fact 
that in the language he uses (dominant structures, levels, instances, modes of 
production, contradictions, etc.), humans and their conscious agency are 
missing. Socialist humanism is a theoretical and political movement. During 
Soviet times, it formulated a critique of the Soviet-style regimes that aimed at 
the humanisation and democratisation of socialism. Its most important political 
moments were the 1956 Hungarian revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring. 
The Soviets crushed both uprisings militarily. In Marxist theory, humanism 
was a theory movement including the Yugoslav praxis group and writers such 
as C.L.R James, Erich Fromm, Georg Lukács, Henri Lefebvre, Herbert 
Marcuse, Jean-Paul Sartre, Karel Kosík, Lucien Goldmann, or Raya 
Dunayevskaya. In Britain, E. P. Thompson was the main representative. 
 
Althusser was critical of Marxist humanism in several respects: At the time 
when he wrote <8:> For Marx and Reading Capital, he saw humanist 
potentials in Chinese and Soviet socialism (Althusser 2005, 222, 236-239). 
Other than Marxist humanists, Althusser considered Marx’s early 
philosophical writings as esoteric, ideological and unscientific. He propagated 
the existence of an epistemological break in the work of Marx that constitutes 
a division between an ideological Marx and a scientific Marx (Althusser 2005, 
13). “In 1845, Marx broke radically with very theory that based history and 
politics on an essence of man” (Althusser 2005, 227). Marx would from then 
on have advanced a theoretical anti-humanism (229) and have focused on 
using “new concepts, the concepts of mode of production, forces of 
production, relations of production, superstructure, ideology, etc.” (244).  
 
Althusser overlooks the continuity of the notion of the human as social being 
in Marx’s works. In the 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx 
speaks of the human species being a “social being” (Marx 1988, 105). Society 
is “the social fabric” of humans (ibid.). In class society, the exploitation of 
labour limits and cripples humanity, sociality and society. Only a fully 
developed communism “equals humanism” (102). In 1845, Marx formulated 
the importance of human sociality in the 6th thesis on Feuerbach when he 
wrote that “the essence of man” is “the ensemble of social relations” and that 
the species “unites the many individuals” (Marx 1845, 570). The old Marx did 
not, as Althusser claims, abolish this insight, but applied it to the study of 
capitalism. Capital is a critique of political economy in that it shows the social 
and therefore historical character of commodities, labour, money, capital and 
class. Marx criticises capitalism’s fetishistic structure that makes capitalist 
society’s structures appear as non-social and natural. Capital also criticises 
bourgeois thought that reifies capitalist categories in its theories. Marx 
elaborated a critical theory of capitalism that is a critical theory of fetishistic 
society and thought. His analysis of capitalism in Capital is based on the 
insight that the majority of humans in capitalism produce goods and value that 
is not their property, but that the dominant class owns as capital and private 
property. In his early works, he for this phenomenon coined the term 
alienation.  
 
The alienation of the social in capitalism is not just indirectly present in Capital 
in the form of the critique of fetishism, but also directly as the concept of 
alienation. Marx writes: “On the other hand, the worker always leaves the 
process in the same state as he entered it – a personal source of wealth, but 
deprived of any means of making that wealth a reality for himself. Since, 
before he enters the process, his own labour has already been alienated 
[entfremdet] from him, appropriated by the capitalist, and incorporated with 
capital, it now, in the course of the process, constantly objectifies itself so that 
it becomes a product alien to him [fremdem Produkt]” (Marx 1867a, 716). He 
also says in Capital that the production process is in capitalism a “pestiferous 
source of corruption and slavery”, but will “under the appropriate conditions 
turn into a source of humane development [“Quelle humaner Entwicklung” in 
the German original]” (Marx 1867a, 621). Marx neither dropped the notion of 
alienation nor the concept of communism as humanism, but developed both 
as part of a critical theory of capitalism. It is simply wrong that alienation and 
humanism are “ideological” concepts “used by Marx in his Early Works” 
(Althusser 2005, 249) and that they are only the “characteristic feature of the 
ideological problematic from which Marx emerged” (251). 
 
Althusser is a relational thinker. He conceives a mode of production in 
relational terms as a specific set of “relations between men and relations 
between things” and as “relations between men and things” (Althusser and 
Balibar 2009, 193). He coins in this context the notion of the combinatory 
(194) for stressing the “combination (Verbindung) of a certain number of 
elements” (193). Also society is for Althusser relational, it is an “articulation” of 
the “region of the economic […] with other regions, legal-political and 
ideological superstructure” (198). Balibar argues that articulation means the 
“construction (Bau) or mechanism of ‘correspondence’ in which the social 
formation is presented as constituted out of different levels” – “an economic 
base, legal and political forms, and ideological forms” (228). 
 
Étienne Balibar’s section in Reading Capital is a more thorough engagement 
with Marx than Althusser’s <9:> part. By and large, Balibar takes over 
Althusser’s basic assumptions. He describes the mode of production as a 
connection of two connections (Althusser and Balibar 2009, 241): the relations 
of production (a property connection between humans, i.e. in capitalism 
between capital and labour) and the productive forces (a real/material 
appropriation connection between humans and nature).  
 
The Althusserian concept of articulation is always either an articulation 
between structures or a determination of humans by structures. This becomes 
evident when Althusser writes that there is “a certain attribution of the means 
of production to the agents of production” (193). Relations of production 
determine “the places and functions occupied and adopted by the agents of 
production” (198) so that “they are the ‘supports’ (Träger) of these functions” 
(199). Humans are for Althusser not society’s subjects. “The true ‘subjects’ 
are these definers and distributors: the relations of production” (199). Also for 
Balibar, the combination of elements forms society’s subject of history (280). 
Humans are for Balibar “supports for the connexions implied by the structure”; 
they “fulfil certain determinate functions in the structure” (283).  
 
So in Althusserianism, humans are always subordinated bearers of structures. 
This approach does not give attention to how structures need to be produced 
and constantly reproduced through human practices. Societal relations are 
not abstract, but lived by humans in everyday social relations. Communication 
is humans’ concrete production and reproduction of social relations. Human 
communication is the process, in which humans connect societal structures to 
their lived experiences and these lived experiences enter societal structures. 
Given that humans and their practices have a subordinated role in Althusser’s 
approach, it is no surprise that communication is not a relevant concept. In 
For Marx, the term communication is not used a single time. In Reading 
Capital, the term communication appears twice. Once in a Marx quote that 
mentions means of communication (Althusser and Balibar 2009, 245) and 
another time in respect to the question of how to read Marx (355).  
 
In the collection Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Althusser uses the 
term communication for the presentation of a philosophical contribution 
(Althusser 1971, 23, 26-27) and in the context of ideological state 
apparatuses. The communications ideological state apparatus (ISA) is for 
Althusser one of eight ISAs (Althusser 1971, 143). It includes “press, radio 
and television, etc.” (143). Althusser discerns communications from the 
cultural ISA that includes “Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.” (143). Theatre, live 
music, sports entertainment certainly are also forms of communication just 
like the press, radio and television are forms of culture that communicate 
information that allows humans to reproduce their minds.  
 
Overall, the notion of communication hardly plays a role in Althusser’s works. 
In an anti-humanist approach that denies that humans are society’s subject, it 
does not come as a surprise that there is no place for communicative 
practices. In the single instances where communication is mentioned in 
Althusser’s works, it is reduced to ideological structures and is pluralised as 
communications (=communication systems).  
 
In capitalism’s economic mode of production, workers through communication 
co-operate in the production process, managers through authoritative 
communication command labour, money and exchange-value are the 
“language of commodities” (Marx 1867a, 143) that acts as means for 
communicating prices, etc. In the political system, parliamentary debates, 
election campaigns, demonstrations and programmes are specific forms of 
political communication. In the cultural system, an ideology communicates 
dominant ideas to the public in order to try to gain and secure hegemony. 
Production, control, exchange, politics and ideology do not simply exist as 
structures, but are only possible through concrete communicative practices, in 
which humans relate to each other, make meaning of each other and the 
world, and produce and reproduce use-values and social structures. 
Althusser’s theory remains too abstract and structuralist for making sense of 
communication. 
 
4. Edward P. Thompson 
 
The Poverty of Theory is Thompson’s (1978) more than 200-page-long 
critique of Althusser and Althusserianism. Thompson argues that the notion of 
“men as träger”, as bearers, supports and carriers of functions, was already 
during Marx’s <10:> lifetime an ideology that “sought exactly to impose this 
structure upon the working class, and, at the same time, to convince them that 
they were powerless to resist these ‘immutable’ laws” (Thompson 1978, 147-
148). “Althusser has simply taken over a reigning fashion of bourgeois 
ideology and named it ‘Marxism’” (153). The problem is that structuralism 
sees humans as passive and not active beings. In this approach, humans “are 
structured by social relations” and “thought by ideologies” (153). Althusser 
overlooks the “dialogue between social being and social consciousness” that 
“goes in both directions” (9).  
 
One should note that Marx does not exclusively use the term Träger (bearer) 
in respect to humans. He for example also writes that use-values are bearers 
of exchange-value (Marx 1867a, 126) and “bearers of value” (138). And he 
describes machinery as a “repository [Träger] of capital” (526). And Marx 
does indeed, as indicated by Thompson, not describe capital and labour as 
constituted by passive humans without subjectivity. An example is a passage, 
where Marx writes about the movement of capital: 
 
As the conscious bearer [Träger] of this movement, the possessor of money becomes 
a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from which the money starts, 
and to which it returns. The objective content of the circulation we have been 
discussing – the valorization of value – is his subjective purpose, and it is only in so far 
as the appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force behind 
his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified and endowed 
with consciousness and a will. Use-values must therefore never be treated as the 
immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit on any single transaction. His aim is 
rather the unceasing movement of profit-making. This boundless drive for enrichment, 
this passionate chase after value, is common to the capitalist and the miser; but while 
the miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist is a rational miser (Marx 1867a, 
254). 
 
The capitalist (as well as the worker) is for Marx conscious, purposefully 
acting, wilful, passionate, and rational. Workers and capitalists are active 
subjects in the production and reproduction of capitalism. The labour contract 
between capitalist and worker is a structural form of violence that compels the 
worker to enter a relationship of exploitation. The point is that within 
capitalism, the worker has difficulty to escape the fact s/he has to sell her 
labour-power because the market is an institutionalised form of economic 
violence or what Marx (1867a, 899) terms the “silent compulsion of economic 
relations”. Exchange-value and markets are principles that force the worker to 
actively seek to sell his/her labour-power on the market in order to be 
exploited. Class society’s institutionalised violence conditions the possibilities 
and rights of classes and their members. The key aspect is the right to private 
ownership of the means of production that the bourgeois state defends. 
Capitalism’s structural violence of markets and the state results in workers’ 
actively seeking to sell their labour-power and capitalists’ actively controlling 
the production process: The capitalist “proceeds to consume the commodity, 
the labour-power he has just bought, i.e. he causes the worker, the bearer of 
that labour-power, to consume the means of production by his labour.. […] 
First, the worker works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour 
belongs; […] Secondly, the product is the property of the capitalist and not 
that of the worker, its immediate producer” (Marx 1867a, 291-292). 
 
Thompson (1978) criticises two aspects of Althusser’s and Althusserians’ 
model of society: a) The dualistic separation of levels is undialectical; b) The 
causal reduction of levels to the economy is mechanistic, reductionist, and 
static. Levels are “empty of all social and historical content” (95). Instances 
and levels “are in fact human activities, institutions, and ideas” that humans 
experience (97). For the British socialist thinker William Morris, culture would 
in contrast to Althusser not have derived from the economy. Rather, capitalist 
society is “founded upon forms of exploitation which are simultaneously 
economic, moral and cultural” (294). Thompson here forgot to mention the 
political. The reduction of the social to the economy is for Thompson not 
society’s ontology, but a capitalist strategy. He therefore speaks of 
“capitalism’s innate tendency to reduce all human relationships to economic 
definitions” (294). Althusser propagates a “total collapse of all human activities 
back into the <11:> elementary terms of a mode of production” (97) and 
constructs a “conceptual prison”, in which “mode of production = social 
formation” (163).  
 
Perry Anderson (1980) interposes to Thompson’s critique that Balibar and 
Althusser see a plurality in the modes of production active in a social 
formation (67) and that Thompson’s account of society is not so different from 
Althusser’s: Thompson in The Poverty of Theory would just like Althusser 
break down society into the regions of the economy, polity, and culture 
(Anderson 1980, 70). The difference that Anderson overlooks is, however, 
that for Althusser these realms are much more separate from each other and 
determined by the economy, whereas Thompson argues that they dialectically 
operate in each other and that the economic mode of production is not 
determining society. Formulated differently, we can say that a societal 
formation is a totality, in which human agency produces, reproduces and is 
conditioned by dialectically interconnected and overgrasping economic, 
political and cultural systems, institutions and structures. Thompson’s 
approach comes much closer to a structure/agency-dialectic than the one of 
Althusser. 
 
Thompson (1978) argues that “Althusserianism is Stalinism reduced to the 
paradigm of theory” (182) and “the attempt to reconstruct Stalinism at the 
level of theory” (131). Althusser says that when he entered the Parti 
communiste français (PCF), philosophy was impossible. It would have been 
Stalin who “reduced the madness to a little more reason” (Althusser 2005, 22) 
and delivered “the first shock” (Althusser 2005, 27) so that Marxist philosophy 
became possible in the PCF. Thompson argues that Althusser here refers to 
Stalin’s (1950/1972) Marxism and the Problems of Linguistics, a text for which 
Althusser “has always shown unusual respect” (Thompson 1978, 79). 
 
Thompson was a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain  (CPGB) 
from 1942 until 1956 (131), Althusser a member of the Parti communiste 
français (PCF) from 1948 onwards (131). The CPGB suspended John Saville 
and E. P. Thompson after they had founded the socialist humanist journal The 
Reasoner. Its subtitle was A Quarterly Journal of Socialist Humanism. 
Thompson and Saville commented: “The Executive Committee’s statement 
makes it clear that a decisive factor in their action was our editorial 
condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary. The meaning of the Executive’s 
decision is this: despite our own attempt to find some way for compromise, 
the leadership of the British Communist Party is determined not to permit 
discussion to develop in the party free from their control, since they fear that 
such discussion might lead on to the ‘de-Stalinisation’ of the British party – the 
ridding of the party of authoritarian methods and attitudes, and of political 
subservience to the Soviet leadership. […] We do not intend to appeal against 
the Executive’s decision, and we have both decided to resign from the party at 
once” (Saville 1994, 31). 
 
Thompson (1978) asks: “So where was Althusser in 1956?” (132). In 1956, 
Althusser was a member of the PCF, whereas Thompson left the CPGB. “In 
1956 it was, at length, officially ‘revealed’ that Stalinism had, for decades, 
been swatting down men like flies” (132). In 1946, the Soviet military also 
crushed the Hungarian uprising. PCF leader Maurice Thorez, who saw Stalin 
as “an eminent Marxist theoretician, a great organizer” (Thorez 1960b), 
argued that the Hungarian rebellion posed the threat of “fascist barbarism” 
(Thorez 1960a) and that Soviet military intervention was therefore needed. 
Thompson (1978) argues that Althusser’s reaction to 1956 would have been a 
critique of socialist humanism (132). Socialist humanism was “the voice of a 
Communist opposition, of a total critique of Stalinist practice and theory” 
(132). Thompson argues that at the time when Althusser denounced socialist 
humanism, this was a typical move in defence of the Soviet regime (128-130). 
Althusser would have used a trick, in which “resurgent Stalinism presents 
itself as anti-Stalinism” (128). In contrast to Thompson, Althusser saw human 
potentials in Soviet socialism under Khrushchev and Brezhnev and in Chinese 
socialism under Mao. 
 
Perry Anderson (1980) defends Althusser by arguing that he was not a 
Stalinist, but a Maoist (107-110), and that in the 1970s he spoke out against 
Stalinism and was in favour of the Workers’ Defence Committee in Poland 
(111). Anderson misses that Thompson’s main point is about the parallels 
between Stalin’s and Althusser’s theoretical approaches and their political 
implications.  
 
<12:> Stalin was “a mixture of Marxist theorist, pragmatist, and hypocrite” 
(Thompson 1978, 141). For Stalin, history is a process without subject and 
human agency, humans are only “supports” or “vectors of ulterior structural 
determinations” (Thompson 1978, 79). Stalin (1939) describes the 
development of society based on Engels’ dialectics of nature in 
correspondence to natural laws. He sees history as a linear succession of 
modes of production determined by the economy. It is a “process of 
development from the lower to the higher” (Stalin 1939, 109). “This means 
that the history of development of society is above all the history of the 
development of production, the history of the modes of production which 
succeed each other in the course of centuries, the history of the development 
of productive forces and people’s relations of production” (121). The economic 
mode of production would determine the superstructure: “Whatever is the 
mode of production of a society, such in the main is the society itself, its ideas 
and theories, its political views and institutions. Or, to put it more crudely, 
whatever is man’s manner of life, such is his manner of thought”  (121). Given 
the natural development of society, the October Revolution would have 
necessarily resulted in the establishment of a socialist society: “[T]he U.S.S.R. 
has already done away with capitalism and has set up a Socialist system” 
(Stalin 1939, 119).  
 
The implication of these theoretical assumptions was for Stalin that anyone 
who was critical of him was a counter-revolutionary who opposed socialism 
and wanted to establish capitalism in Russia and therefore needed to be 
killed. This became for example evident when Stalin commented shorty after 
Nikolai Bukharin, one of the main Bolshevik theorists, had been arrested in 
1937. Bukharin was put on trial together with others, was convicted to death 
for planning a conspiratorial coup, planning terrorism and for anti-Soviet 
espionage. He was executed in March 1938. Stalin said: “I think it is clear to 
everybody now that the present-day wreckers and diversionists, no matter 
what disguise they may adopt, either Trotskyite or Bukharinite, have long 
ceased to be a political trend in the labour movement, that they have become 
transformed into a gang of professional wreckers, diversionists, spies and 
assassins, without principles and without ideals. Of course, these gentlemen 
must be ruthlessly smashed and uprooted as the enemies of the working 
class, as betrayers of our country” (Stalin 1937, 277). Stalin’s mechanistic 
interpretation of history and society justified the killing of his opponents. Mao 
(1937) was in his analysis of dialectical contradictions full of praise for Stalin’s 
theory and politics: “Stalin’s analysis provides us with a model for 
understanding the particularity and the universality of contradiction and their 
interconnection” (330). “The history of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union shows us that the contradictions between the correct thinking of Lenin 
and Stalin and the fallacious thinking of Trotsky, Bukharin and others did not 
at first manifest themselves in an antagonistic form, but that later they did 
develop into antagonism” (344). 
 
Thompson was concerned about the parallels between mechanistic 
conceptions of society by the likes of Stalin and Mao and Althusserianism’s 
concept of society that for example argues that “every mode of production 
necessarily induces the existence of the (superstructural) instances that 
specifically correspond to it” (Althusser 2003, 23) or that the “history of society 
can be reduced to a discontinuous succession of modes of production” 
(Althusser and Balibar 2009, 229). Thompson criticised both the theoretical 
homology and the political abuse that such theorising entails.  
 
At this point it will have become evident to the reader that my theoretical and 
political sympathies are with humanism and not structuralism. Thompson’s 
approach has advantages and at the same time certain limits. His key 
category is class experience. Experience arises because humans are rational 
beings who “think about what is happening to themselves and their world” 
(Thompson 1978, 8). Changed experience “exerts pressures upon existent 
social consciousness” (8). Experience includes culture, ideas, instincts, 
feelings, norms, obligations, values, beliefs, affects, morals (Thompson 1978, 
171), needs, <13:> interests, consciousness (164), myth, science, law, 
ideology (9), and thought (98). Experience in relation to class has to do with 
class-consciousness expressed in a class’ culture, traditions, values, ideas 
and institutions (Thompson 1963, 10). Popular culture derives from common 
experience and customs in common (Thompson 1993). 
 
It is evident that some of the terms that Thompson associates with experience 
relate to individual subjectivity, others to collective subjectivity, and some 
have to do with both. Experience is both social and individual. The theoretical 
problem that arises is when Thompson (1978, 98) argues that experience is a 
“middle term between social being and social consciousness” (Thompson 
1978, 98) and that “as being is thought so thought is also lived – people may, 
within limits, live the social or sexual expectations which are imposed upon 
them by dominant conceptual categories” (Thompson 1978, 9).  
 
The theoretical problematic is to discern the individual’s thoughts from the 
everyday relations, in which humans live and act. Experience certainly 
includes both dimensions, but a term seems to be missing that allows us to 
distinguish human social experience from individual experience as well as 
collective from individual subjectivity. Whereas cognition and thinking are 
always ongoing in the individual’s brain, they are only possible through and at 
the same time constitute the foundation of communication. Through 
communication humans live, produce, and reproduce society’s structures in 
everyday life and do so based on their individual subjectivity that in the 
communication process is symbolically externalised in mutual interaction with 
at last another human subject. Communication is a necessary condition for 
the formation of collective subjectivity (shared identities, norms and values, 
rules, common practices). Communication is the missing link in Thompson’s 
work, the category that allows us to discern between individual subjectivity 
and collective subjectivity. Communication is the process, in which humans’ 
individual subjectivities meet, share knowledge, and produce and reproduce a 
collective subjectivity. 
 
Class is for Thompson (1963, 9) not a structure or category, but a historical 
and human relationship. Class happens “when some men, as a result of 
common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of 
their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose 
interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs” (Thompson 1963, 
9). “Class is defined by men as they live their own history, and, in the end, this 
is its only definition” (Thompson 1963, 11). Classes “arise because men and 
women, in determinate productive relations, identify their antagonistic 
interests, and come to struggle, to think, and to value in class ways” 
(Thompson 1978, 106-107). Perry Anderson (1980, 42) importantly points out 
that it seems that for Thompson “class = class consciousness”. Thompson’s 
understanding of class faces the problem that classes “have frequently 
existed whose members did not “’identify their antagonistic interests’ in any 
process of common clarification of struggle” (Anderson 1980, 40) and that it 
implies the possibility of class struggle without class and of class struggle 
operating only with the existence of a ruling class (42). That humans’ position 
in the relations of production determines class status does not mean that 
class is an abstract structure. Rather class is lived in everyday economic 
relations in one’s own class and between classes. And these social relations 
are established in and through communicative processes. Through 
communication, humans (re)produce social relations, including class relations. 
The decisive question is if the dominated class communicates politically and 
consciously about its class position and based on this conscious 
communication organises itself politically. Class is always objective (a class 
structure in society) and subjective (lived through communication) at the same 
time (class objectivity subjectified, class subjectivity objectified), but it is not 
always politically organised.  
 
Ideology is certainly not a key category for Thompson, which means that an 
important form of subjectivity and consciousness is rather missing in his 
approach. He criticises that for Althusser ideology is in the form of ideological 
state apparatuses “imposed upon the innocent and utterly passive, recipient, 
man” (Thompson 1978, 174). Thompson argues that moral values are not 
mechanically imposed and “hailed”, but “lived” (175). He does not reject the 
notion of ideology, but stresses that ideology not just works top-down, but has 
a bottom-up hegemonic dimension:  
 
<14:> “This is not to say that values are independent of the colouration of 
ideology; […] But to suppose from this that they are ‘imposed’ (by a State!) as 
‘ideology’ is to mistake the whole social and cultural process. This imposition 
will always be attempted, with greater or lesser success, but it cannot 
succeed at all unless there is some congruence between the imposed rules 
and view-of-life and the necessary business of living a given mode of 
production” (175). Ideologies are situated in “the people’s way of life” that is 
“culture’s material abode” (176).  
 
Thompson well points out ideology’s subject/object-dialectic. But the problem 
is that he assumes a certain determinism of resistance against ideology: 
“Moreover, values no less than material needs will always be a locus of 
contradiction, of struggle between alternative values and views-of-life” (175). 
“Conflicts of values, and choices of values, always take place” (175). Ideology 
is always a communication process, in which dominant groups try to justify 
and impose their moral values on others. If this attempt is (un)successful, 
partly (un)successful, or temporarily (un)successful depends on many factors, 
including the availability and distribution of power. If the dominant class can 
mobilise means of power (such as the mass media, public discourses, money, 
influence, reputation), then it can increase the likelihood to successfully 
impose ideologies. The ideological communication processes’ outcomes are 
not arbitrary, but subject to power dynamics and asymmetries that confront 
dominated groups.  
 
In the 832 pages of The Making of the English Working Class, Thompson 
(1963) uses the terms communication(s) and to communicate less than 30 
times, always in theoretically unreflected manners (see pages 24, 134, 195, 
219, 378, 385, 442, 503, 516, 543, 597, 598, 609, 616, 651, 652, 684, 701, 
746, 749, 758, 786, 808, 818). The one communication issue that Thompson 
is more interested in are militant working class movements’ forms of 
underground communication. He speaks of an “underground chain of 
communication” (698), enciphered communication (169), and the Luddites’ 
secret, masked and disguised communications (554, 565, 478). In The 
Poverty of Theory and Other Essays’ 404 pages, Thompson (1978) mentions 
the words communication, communications and to communicate 14 times (on 
pages 110, 136, 174, 191, 221, 262, 266, 273, 336, 386, 391, 393). The 
analysis allows us to conclude that communication is a largely absent 
theoretical category in Thompson’s works. His theoretical limit is that he 
ignores the role of communication in respect to experience, class and 
ideology. 
 
Communication is the blind spot of both Althusser’s and Thompson’s 
approach and many other Marxist works and theories. A Marxist theory of 
communication is needed. What we can learn from the controversy between 
Althusser and Thompson is that thinking about the relationships between the 
economic and the non-economic and between structures and agency poses 
key theoretical questions for any social theory, including a Marxist theory of 
communication.  
 
5. Towards a Critical Theory of Communication 
 
5.1. Communication in Society: Communication as the Process of 
(Re)Producing Social Relations within Societal Relations 
 
For Althusser and Balibar, articulation is an expression of society’s relational 
character. But for them, articulation is a relation between structures, not 
between humans, who are for Althusserians just bearers of structures that are 
articulated with each other. For the two authors, the economy determines 
society “in the last instance”. The economy in this approach determines in the 
last instance what a particular society’s determining instance is. The problem 
here is not so much speaking of the last instance, but the notion of 
determination. Given that the social production of resources plays a role in all 
social systems, there can be no doubt that the economy is important 
everywhere in society. The notion of determination implies a too restrictive, 
one-sided and mono-causal relationship. In the case of Althusser, articulation 
not just means relations, but economically (over-)determined relations. At the 
same time, Althusserian relations are abstract and detached from human 
practices. It is therefore no surprise that communication is a blind spot of 
Althusser’s works. That structures mediate human agency means that they 
enable human communication through which social relations are <15:> 
produced and reproduced. At the aggregate level of society, communication 
produces and reproduces societal relations. Wherever there is society, there 
are structure/agency-dialectics. And wherever there are structure/agency- 
dialectics, there is mediation by structures and communication. Society’s 
structures mediate humans’ communicative practices that (re)produce 
structures that are society’s media.  
 
We need to start the analysis of society with humans living in social relations. 
A social relation is a connection between humans that allows them to make 
meaning of each other. This is why Max Weber defines a social relationship 
as “the behavior of a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningful content, 
the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these 
terms” (Weber 1978, 26). A social relation can be ephemeral and transient. 
But it can also become a structure. A structure is a regularised social relation 
that has some stability (the behaviour is repeated or allows repeatability) in 
space-time. Structures provide a social system’s reproducibility in space and 
time. They are the recursive result of humans’ social practices: Humans 
produce and reproduce social structures in and through their actions and 
these structures condition, enable and constrain human behaviour and social 
action in society. There is a dialectic of structures and practices in society. 
Giddens therefore argues that “the structural properties of social systems are 
both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize” 
(Giddens 1984, 25; see Fuchs 2003 for a discussion).  
 
One general sociological insight that plays a key role in Marx’s works is that 
everything in society is a social relation. In Capital, Marx outlines a critical 
sociology of capitalism and shows that commodities, value, labour, money 
and capital are not things, but social relations. Capitalism is constituted 
through the class relationship between labour and capital.  
 
Marx for example writes: 
 
“[…] daß das Kapital nicht eine Sache ist, sondern ein durch Sachen 
vermitteltes Verhältnis zwischen Personen” (Marx 1867b, 793).  
 
Wert ist “etwas rein Gesellschaftliches” (Marx 1867b, 71). 
 
“Die relative Wertform einer Ware” verbirgt “ein gesellschaftliches 
Verhältnis” (Marx 1867b, 71). 
 
English translations of Marx are often not precise and translate 
gesellschaftliches Verhältnis as social relation and gesellschaftlich as social. 
In the Penguin-edition, the three passages above read: 
 
“capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons which is 
mediated through things” (Marx 1867a, 932). 
 
Value is “something purely social” (Marx 1867a, 149) 
 
“The relative value-form […] conceals a social relation” (Marx 1867a, 
149) 
 
Marx refers to the role of the social in society and therefore speaks of capital 
and value as societal relations and something purely societal. Humans in their 
everyday life constantly enter and leave social relations. Society is the totality 
of humans’ social relationships. Given that social systems are interconnected 
through humans’ multiple roles, relations and activities, they are interrelated. 
Social relations are always societal relations because society’s realms of 
interaction shape and are shaped by everyday practices.  
 
Georg Lukács (1971) expresses the societal and relational character of 
human existence with the help of the concept of mediation. Mediation is “a 
lever with which to overcome the mere immediacy of the empirical world” 
(162). “[O]bjects as they are given” (155) are not things-in-themselves. They 
are what they are only through relations and these relations are “the real 
tendencies of the objects themselves” (155). In Hegelian language, being-in-
itself can only exist through being-for-another. A single individual is, as Marx 
says in the 6th thesis on Feuerbach “the ensemble of societal relations” (MEW 
3, 6). Societal relations such as capital can continue to exist when one 
specific capitalist or worker dies because s/he can be replaced. This 
circumstance indicates the general character of societal relations. Social 
relations are in contrast concrete, they are the relations humans enter in their 
everyday life with each other; for example the workplace, where Peter meets 
and co-operates with his colleagues Mary and Joe and where he has a 
quarrel with manager Sandra over working hours, overtime and payment. 
Sandra may leave the company, but <16:> this may not resolve the labour 
disputes as a similarly ruthless manager may replace her.   
 
These everyday relations are organised day in and day out. They take place 
in particular spaces at specific times. Communication is the everyday process 
that establishes and maintains social relations. It is the production and 
reproduction of social relations. Peter and his colleagues only make known 
that they dislike working long hours and think that their pay is too low by 
telling Sandra about it, who is thereby forced to somehow respond on behalf 
of capital. Power relations are abstract societal relations that are instantiated, 
lived, enacted, reproduced and potentially challenged through processes of 
communication in everyday life.  
 
Humans (re)produce social structures through communication in their 
everyday lives and thereby (re)produce societal structures that frame, 
condition, enable and constrain communicative production in everyday life. 
Society is the totality of societal relations. And each societal relation 
encapsulates manifold social relations. A societal relation (such as the class 
relation between capital and labour) is a totality of social relations. It is framed 
by and framing all other societal relations. The class relation is reproduced 
through multiple capitalist organisations, in which workers interact with each 
other and interact with capital. Society is the totality that is the result of and 
condition for human communication. The notion of the totality should not be 
understood as meaning that society in general or particular societies are 
totalitarian. Not just capitalism and class societies are totalities. Every society 
is a totality of over-grasping moments, i.e. systems that reach over into each 
other through human communication. Therefore we are never isolated 
individuals, but all phenomena in society are truly concrete. The “truly 
concrete is not a particular, isolated phenomenon, but an aspect or ‘moment’ 
of a totality” (Lukács 1971, 344). Society is a “complex of complexes” (Lukács, 
1986, 155; see also 181) that help reproducing society (182). 
 
Neither the form nor the content of communication are immaterial. 
Communication is a material practice, which means that it is a social process, 
in which humans create concrete results. Society’s materiality is that it is a 
realm of social production. Marx writes in this context that the “first premise of 
all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals” who 
“produce their means of subsistence” and thereby are “indirectly producing 
their material life” (Marx and Engels 1845/46, 31). Production is in society not 
conducted by isolated individuals, but in social and societal relations. The 
human capacity to communicate is a fundamental human means of 
production that is needed for the (re)production of society and the social. 
“[C]ommunication and its material means are intrinsic to all distinctively 
human forms of labour and social organization” (Williams 1980, 50).  
 
Communication and the production of physical and intangible products are not 
two separate processes. All economic production has a symbolic dimension of 
human interaction. Humans relate to each other in a symbolic way when they 
socially produce structures in order to make sense of each other and the 
world. Structures symbolise society’s relations and thereby on behalf of 
humans something in society. Raymond Williams (1977) stresses in this 
context the “material character of the production of a social and political order” 
(93) and that culture and societies are realms of socio-material production 
(see Fuchs 2015, chapters 2+3). Communicative means are a “means of 
social production” (Williams 1980, 51) that has an “inherent role […] in every 
form of production” (53). Language, books, newspapers, the telegraph, the 
telephone and the Internet are examples of means of mass communication 
that disseminate information over space and make it persistent in time. 
Communication technologies allow the storage (making information durable) 
and transmission (transferring information from one social system and context 
to another) of information. In a more general sense, all social structures 
symbolise in complex ways the human activities that create them and 
communicate information about wealth, influence and status. They are 
(general) means of communication.   
 
For Lukács (1986), society is a complex of complexes, in which humans 
teleologically posit the world. By teleological positing, Lukács means the 
conscious, active production that is goal-oriented and realises subjective 
intentions in the objective world. It is a common feature of work and 
communication <17:> (see Fuchs 2016, chapter 2). Basic goals humans strive 
to achieve in society are the satisfaction of human needs (the economic 
positing), the management and organisation of complexity through collective 
decision-making (the political positing), and the recognition of subjectivity (the 
human body and the mind; the cultural positing). Communication is not 
another type of teleological positing that stands outside economic, political 
and cultural production, but is an immanent feature of all social production. 
Through communication, humans learn to understand each other and the 
world. Through cognition, they try to understand themselves and 
communication. Cognition is the foundation and a result of communication. 
The economic principle of production is universal in that all human activity 
produces results. The base/superstructure-model is not tenable because the 
production of the social operates in all realms of society and constitutes also 
politics’ and culture’s economy. Politics and culture are economic and non-
economic at the same time and also work within the economy.  
 
Communication has an economic dimension in the sense that it produces and 
reproduces sociality. At the same time the created meanings are not restricted 
to the economy, but matter in different social systems and realms of society. 
Communicative capacities and means of communication are social means for 
a means, a means that by producing understanding of oneself, other humans 
and the world helps manage human needs, complexity and subjectivity in 
society.  
 
5.2. Class and Domination  
 
In heteronomous societies, social and societal relations are organised based 
on power inequalities so that particular groups are privileged in the production 
of use-values, collective decisions, and reputation. They thereby are able to 
achieve more wealth, influence or reputation than others. Particularistic 
ownership, elitist politics and privileged status are economic, political and 
cultural principles of stratification that result in asymmetries and inequalities of 
ownership, influence and reputation. In the economy, power inequality and 
asymmetrical ownership are based on one class’ exploitation of another class’ 
labour. In politics and the economy, power inequalities take on the form of 
political and cultural domination. Domination means that a group has the 
means for achieving its will at the expense of others. Exploitation is the 
economic form of domination.  
 
In modern society, the principle of the accumulation of money-capital has 
been generalised as a principle on which society is based. Modern society is 
a generalised form of accumulation, in which classes and social groups strive 
for the accumulation of economic power (money-capital), political power 
(influence on decision-making), and cultural power (reputation). Capitalism is 
not an economic mode of production, but a societal mode of production, a 
societal formation that is based on the principle of accumulation. The capitalist 
economy’s principle of accumulation is a model for the organisation of 
capitalist society, in which the subsystems have relative autonomy and their 
specific forms and logics of accumulation. The logic of accumulation tends to 
result in power asymmetries and distributive injustices. In any heteronomous 
society, mediation takes on the form alienation: Specific groups control the 
products of teleological positings, whereas others do not exercise such 
control. This means that they can appropriate and own others’ labour 
products, impose their political values on collective decisions, impose 
reputational hierarchies, or achieve combinations thereof. Different groups 
can control differing degrees of economic, political and cultural power. In 
general, money is however a privileged means that can easier be transformed 
into political influence and cultural reputation than the other way around.  
 
In modern society, the fetishism of power structures imposes a structure on 
society, in which social structures appear natural, eternal, immutable, 
unchangeable, and thing-like. In economic fetishism, money and commodities 
appear natural. In political and cultural fetishism, offices and status-positions 
appear natural. Society appears to talk to us through things and elite-
individuals. Money, commodities, political offices and status-positions 
symbolise and communicate power. Reified structures hide alienation’s social 
and societal character and that it is therefore the result of power 
contradictions and struggles. Workers’, citizens and subjects’ economic, 
political and cultural struggles have the <18:> potential to strive for the 
abolishment of alienation and the establishment of a different order. 
 
The structure of class and heteronomous societies is inherently contradictory. 
Contradictions tend to result in crises. It is, however, not determined whether 
contradictory power relations or an economic, political or cultural crisis 
resulting from such contradictions or a combination of crises results in social 
struggles on behalf of the dominated groups. Social struggles are always 
possible because history is conditioned, but within this conditionality are 
relatively open. The results are also not pre-determined. But violent structures 
of domination can forestall social struggles. Violence threatens to destroy or 
severely impede human life. It can be physical, structural or ideological in 
character (Galtung 1990). It denies humans their need for survival, well-being, 
identity and freedom (Galtung 1990). Ideologies are a knowledge form 
implicated by fetishistic structures that dominant groups communicate and 
spread in order to try to justify and naturalise domination and exploitation. 
Dominated groups react in specific manners to ideologies. The reactions 
range on a continuum from the subjective acceptance/reproduction of 
ideology on the one end and rejection and resistance to ideology on the other 
end.  
 
4.3. Communication as Societal Commoning 
 
Human reactions to violence, exploitation and domination are not determined. 
It can be that many people endure and do not resist because of conscious or 
unconscious fears of loss just like there can be the rapid or gradual 
emergence of resistance. Humans do not by nature subject themselves 
voluntarily and automatically to domination just like there is no automatism of 
social struggle. Their existential fears and needs for community, harmony, 
security and recognition can be channelled into the acceptance of domination, 
violence and ideologies. Dominated groups’ social struggles mean risk-taking 
and acceptance of uncertainty. If a significant number of the dominated are 
willing to take risks and organise collectively, then collective action, protests, 
revolts, rebellions, or revolutions can emerge. A collective consciousness of 
the organisation emerges. Political organisation is a communication process, 
in which humans come together and interact in order to define their goals, 
their identity and their strategies, based on these they take actions that aim at 
transforming society. Political consciousness can be, but is not necessarily 
and not automatically progressive in character. Individual and collective 
consciousness that questions domination is a possibility, but not a necessity. 
It can also be ideological (e.g. nationalist, racist, fascist, etc.) in character. 
Social struggles are not automatically politically progressive and there is no 
guarantee that their outcome is a better condition than before. A new social 
order can only emerge when objective contradictions are subjectively 
reflected in a collective manner so that political action aimed at societal 
transformation emerges.  
 
The term communication in modern language is derived from the Latin verb 
communicare and the noun communicatio. Communicare means to share, 
inform, unite, participate, and literally to make something common. A 
heteronomous and class-divided society is a society based on particularistic 
control. Struggles for the commons in contrast aim at overcoming class and 
heteronomy and to make society a realm of common control. In a common 
economy, the means of production are owned collectively. In a common 
polity, everyone can directly shape and participate in collective decision-
making. In a common culture, everyone is recognised. In such a participatory 
democracy, humans speak and communicate as a common voice. They own 
and decide together and give recognition to each other. A communicative 
society is not a society in which humans communicate because humans have 
to communicate in all societies in order to survive. A communicative society is 
also not an information society, in which knowledge and 
information/communication technologies have become structuring principles. 
A communicative society is a society, in which the original meaning of 
communication as making something common is the organising principle. 
Society and therefore also communication’s existence then correspond to 
communication’s essence. A communicative society is a society controlled in 
common so that communication is sublated and turned from the general 
process of the production of sociality into the very principle on which <19:> 
society is founded. A communicative society also realises the identity of 
communicare (communicating, making common) and communis (community). 
Society becomes a community of the commons. Such a society is a 




Althusser’s structuralist theory is anti-humanist in character, which results in a 
theoretical subordination of humans under structures and the assumption that 
economic structures determine society. As a consequence, there is no space 
for communicative practices in this approach. Thompson’s humanist Marxist 
approach foregrounds the notion of human experience. It takes the 
structure/agency- and base/superstructure-problems into dialectical 
directions, but fails to differentiate between individual and collective 
subjectivity, faces the dangers of a subjectivist notion of class, and 
overestimates resistance. Communication is the missing link in this approach. 
 
A Marxist theory of communication needs to relate the notion of 
communication to the study of society, class, capitalism and the commons. 
Communication is the process, in which humans produce and reproduce 
social relations and thereby live, reproduce and potentially challenge societal 
relations (structures) in their everyday life by making meaning of each other 
and (re)producing the social and societal world. They do so based on their 
individual subjectivities that meet in the communication process. 
Communication does not stand outside of domination, but shapes and is 
shaped by structures of class, violence and resistance. It is the intermediate 
process that organises the dialectic of objective structures and human 
subjects in society as well as the dialectic of individual and collective 
subjectivity. The communicative production of sociality explodes the 
base/superstructure distinction and constitutes interwoven dialectics of the 
economic and the non-economic. A forgotten meaning of communication is 
that it is the very process of commoning. Communication shares knowledge, 
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